

EM1 [REDACTED]

Below is a summary of interview of EM1 [REDACTED], USCG, conducted by the AIM informal board on August 24, 2006 concerning the diving incident which resulted in two deaths on August 17, 2006. AIM board members present at the interview were Captain [REDACTED], LCDR [REDACTED], and LCDR [REDACTED].

EM1 [REDACTED] reported aboard CGC HEALY in [REDACTED]. He is an [REDACTED] who focuses mostly on drive systems. His primary watch station is [REDACTED]. He has been qualified for about a year. He previously sailed aboard CGC STEADFAST.

On 17 August he had the 1600-2000 EOW watch. The ship was hove-to in the ice planning for ice liberty. At some point he remembers seeing BM2 DUQUE standing around near the bow with some kind of glove problem. EM1 [REDACTED] remembers thinking to himself - no tag outs had been completed, and assumed that there were not going to be diving operations and/or that the bridge would call down and let the EOW know. Diving Operations were not passed down when he relieved the watch, he had not seen any tag outs, and he had not received notification from anyone. He only saw BM2 DUQUE because he happened to go topside for a smoke break. His assumption was that BM2 DUQUE was the standby diver for a polar bear swim.

The policy aboard HEALY was that if a dive was planned aboard the ship, certain suction, etc., would be secured, and the Engineering Department would be notified at least 24 hours in advance. Break-in watchstanders were told not to allow a dive without proper notice. That, however, was the pier side rule and he wasn't entirely sure if the policy was different underway. He had not seen a dive on or near the ship underway in his time aboard HEALY - roughly a year and a half.

He saw a dive at the beginning of the last inport period. For that dive LCDR [REDACTED] did the checkoffs, and he had helped her tag out some equipment. Dive operations were not a standard part of EOW training. He does not cover it with his break-in's and does not remember being taught anything about dive ops when he reported to engineering.

While on watch he kept his primary attention on the CCTV that rotated through the different machinery spaces. He kept the second CCTV screen tuned for a camera near the bow that showed some of the ice liberty events. He tried to aim it at the polar bear swim area, up forward, but the camera was blocked by the hull.

Following his return from chow relief he noticed that people were running in and out of the screen on the CCTV camera pointed toward liberty events. He could see people were frantic about something, but could not tell what was going on. MCPO [REDACTED] had relieved the Technician of the Watch (TOW) so he could go out on the ice.

EM1 [REDACTED] continued to maintain the plant in ECC at 10 shaft turns, until directed to bring other machinery on line. Shortly thereafter the ship was u/w making way.

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In response to questions EM1 [REDACTED] stated the following:

- He saw only one tender from the camera, and could not see much of the dive side.
- The aft sea chest suction is powered by the ship's buoyancy.
- Tag outs are generally part of a dive plan and a member of the dive team follows through to ensure they are completed.

[REDACTED]

EM1 26 AUG 2000